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A. LincolnYankee Gossip & Speculation in Regard to the Attack on Charleston |
From the Charleston Mercury, published
April 11, 1863We have Northern dates to the 4th instant inclusively. The New York papers teem with statements and speculations in regard to the attack on Charleston. Carleton, the correspondent of the Boston Journal, writing from Hilton Head, under the date of March 23, shows the difficulties the Yankee forces, especially the naval portion of them, will have to contend against, in the siege of Charleston, which the same correspondent says is now about to commence. He writes: "In former letters I have pointed out some of the obstacles to be surmounted before we come in possession of Charleston. Further intelligence does not lessen the difficulties. The fact that the Monitor received the broadside of the Merrimac so near that the rammers of the cannoniers almost touched as they rammed them from the port holes, has been taken as conclusive that our iron-clads can run past Sumter, Moultrie, the batteries of Sullivan and Morris Islands, past the [illegible] batteries, paying no heed to the tornado of shot and shell belched from the one- thousand cannon reported to be in position and make a straight course for the city of Charleston. It is possible to do that, but a thing not probable. "There are three ways of steering vessels---by sight, by lead, and by compass. In a great naval engagement the immense volumes of smoke will be likely to shut out prominent objects from sight, and render steering by that method ineffectual. To stand on the [illegible] deck of the Nahaut or Passaic and throw the [illegible] under such a fire as the rebels will concentrate upon our little fleet, will require a coolness which few men possess; besides, it will be a hazard which Admiral DuPont will not require unless absolutely necessary. To steer by compass in a narrow channel is not practicable. The steering must be done mainly by sight. Fortunately, we have accurate surveys of this harbor, and pilots who are intimately acquainted with the channels. If the attack is made at high water, the light draft of the Ironclads will enable them to take position to suit their own convenience. "We have supposed that because the Monitor resisted the shot of the Merrimac, and at the same time accomplished so much with her eleven inch guns, that the fifteen inch guns would knock everything in the shape of masonry or earthwork defences to pieces; but it has become apparent that our Ordnance Department has not kept pace with progress in marine architecture. All of our large guns are of cast iron. As we increase the calibre, we are compelled to decrease the quantity or quality of powder ---or in other words, reduce the velocity given to the shot. The powder used must be slow burning, grains as large as [illegible]. Rifle powder, which ignites with the quickness of lightning, would send the gun and its carriage head over heels from it's position, or split the gun into fragments. By increasing the weight of the ball, we increase it's crushing power, but a rifled hundred Parrot gun, for penetrating or boring purposes, throwing a shot at high speed, will probably be found to be superior to the fifteen inch, four hundred pound shot, hurled, as they must be, with comparative slow velocity. Fifteen inch guns are as yet untried. The Ordnance Department is all at sea in regard to them. They may fulfill the most sanguine expectations, and they may be found less efficient even than the eleven inch guns. The experiment is to be tried. You remember that great results were predicted of the Lancaster gun in the Crimea. It was to send the shot completely through Todtleben's fortifications, but it proved to be a failure. Till they have been put to the test, we cannot unqualifiedly and unreservedly expect that these monsters will completely destroy the defences that Beauregard has erected. They cannot be served with the rapidity of lighter ordnance. It requires hard [illegible] to handle shot weighing four hundred pounds. In all, we shall have but eight turreted vessels and the new Ironsides---thirty-two guns. The wooden gunboats undoubtedly will take a part, but it will be of necessity at long range. Thirty-two guns against one thousand as reported. Beauregard boasts that two minutes exposure of one of our Ironclads at close range under his converging fires, will use them up. The rebel fire will be hot. It will be a continued roar of thunder, a continual battering of show upon the iron mall. They have Whitworth guns which throw steel [illegible] shot. Fortunately, we came in possession of several thousand shot intended for them when we captured the Ocean Wave. I have faith in the power of the iron-clads to withstand their hottest fire, but it is yet to be determined whether, with our necessarily slow manipulations, we can silence the batteries opposed. "The labor will be exhaustive. A crew will hardly handle those heavy guns day after day, and week after week without exhaustion. Cessation of fire will enable the rebels to repair damage. You remember how the Malakoff held out, and the Redan knocked all to pieces by day---but made good as ever by night---how at last they were carried by a terrible assault and the slaughter of thousands of men. The rebel batteries are not like those Crimean strongholds, but they are, nevertheless, formidable works. "But though there may be delay and failure at first, let there be no despondency on the part of the people of the North, for sooner or later Charleston, Moultrie and Sumter will be 'repossessed' by the United States. I have written thus, not from apprehension of failure, but because I am near the expected scene of action and have information of what the rebels are doing. "The defense powers of our Iron-clads are satisfactorily ascertained, but not so their offensive powers. It is wisdom in everything to take ability into account---to take all contingencies into consideration, and then make up the estimate, and obtain a basis for reasonable expectation." |
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